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Introduction
International organizations like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank have been supporting reform initiatives in developing country governments since at least the 1980s.
Various authors have criticized this support, arguing that international organizations use their influence to impose common models of government on developing countries-infringing on the sovereignty of these nations and frustrating domestic processes of finding and fitting government structures to local contexts. Some suggest that a modern new public management model of government is being imposed on developing countries, whereas others claim that developing countries are being forced to adopt a broad-brush neoliberal script.
1 Such claims are seldom reinforced by empirical evidence showing the extent or nature of this influence, however. This leaves one asking, "Do international organizations really shape government solutions in developing countries?" This article explores such question and finds that international organizations do have a major (and growing) influence on government structures in developing countries and that this influence does impose a common model on these countries.
The article comes to these findings by examining the content of all World Bank projects in the Public Administration, Law and Justice (PAL&J) sector since the 1950s. This study is made possible because of the public availability of the organization's project database. This obviously does not allow a complete perspective on the work of all international organizations but it is likely to provide a sufficiently reliable view given the prominence of the World Bank in the development community. The World Bank has arguably dominated both the intellectual space and applied project and loan activity surrounding government reform in this community.
As a result of this role, patterns emerging in World Bank reform engagements are likely to be representative of broad behavior in the international development community.
The article has three sections. The first provides some basic background on the thinking behind public sector reform in development, noting how it emerged in response to new institutional arguments that 'rules of the game' in governments impacted growth prospects of developing countries. This section also introduces readers to World Bank projects in the PAL&J sector, noting that these operations typically embedded various kinds of government reform activities. A second section looks at the emerging of the government reform agenda, as supported by international organizations like the World Bank. Evidence presented here shows that external influence is wide spread across all countries and had been growing-in numbers of projects and value of engagement. This shows that organizations like the World Bank are increasingly shaping the ideas, opportunities, demand and supply of public sector reform in developing countries. A third section then shows that the projects and interventions look remarkably similar across the very different sets of countries affected. Countries are commonly supported in creating governments that are market-friendly, disciplined, and modernized; with specific types of common interventions introducing reforms like privatization, civil service modernization, the creation of autonomous agencies, and more.
A conclusion points out that this model is reinforced by indicators that define 'good' or 'accepted' or 'right' rules of the game in governments in developing countries. The discussion does not decry or endorse the particularities of this common model of externally sponsored reform. It simply notes that it exists and is reflected in patterns of World Bank project data. The conclusion points to a needed analysis of the implications of this finding by asking a simple question: "What does it matter if international agencies are defining governmental solutions in developing countries?"
New institutional economics and government reform in development
The language and theory of new institutional economics has framed public sector reform since the 1980s. This theory posits that society consists of formal and informal rules-institutionsthat shape incentives people and organizations have to behave. 2 Governments are the hub of many such rules, bound by some and the maker and enforcer of others. These are the 'rules of the game' that shape a government's size, scope, operation and influence on society.
Theorists claim that different institutions create incentives for different behavior, leading to different outcomes. In shaping behavior, theorists claim that different institutions have different affects on economic progress. The key to development, as this argument suggests, is "finding the right institutional framework" or 'rules of the game'. 3 Governments have been the focus of such search in development. As a result, much government change is called 'public sector institutional reform' and "involves fundamental changes in governmental "rules of the game"" towards those considered 'right' for development. These countries accepted externally influenced public sector reforms because the associated finances were required to maintain stability. Newly formed administrations also hoped engagements with organizations like the World Bank would enhance their government's legitimacy. This was vital for raising finance through debt, attracting foreign direct investment, and otherwise engaging in a globalizing world economy. Perhaps part of this signaling effort, over 100 World Bank PAL&J projects in the 1980s were called 'adjustment' programs. 12 These sought primarily to stabilize unstable government finances. They also introduced substantive change to the way public sectors looked, how large they were, what they did, and how they operated. Adjustment operations comprised a significant portion of the 469 World Bank projects focused at least partly on public sector reforms in this sector in the decade. These accounted for about 20 percent of World Bank loans in the 1980s, indicating the emerging importance of externally supported public sector reforms in development at the time. These reforms were an integral part of the growing 'Washington Consensus' that embraced discipline and controlled governments as a valuable norm and model for developing countries.
The importance of public sector reforms continued to grow into the 1990s. PAL&J activities were present in over 1,700 World Bank projects in the 1990s (62 percent 
The pervasive nature of these reforms
The steep growth in public sector reform operations in the last twenty years has meant that this kind of intervention is now common. and 2010. These cost over $4 billion.
A common model of the 'right rules' of government
The pervasive nature of externally influenced public sector reform in development is impressive; especially considering these reforms emerged only recently. Government reform is now influenced by external development organizations in countries of all types and in all regions. The growth in project numbers suggests this influence has grown over time as well. Andrews 2005 Andrews , 2008 Andrews , 2009 Andrews , 2010 Andrews , 2011 Andrews , 2013 Chang 2003; Grindle 2004; Rodrik 2007. 23 Rodrik (2007, 182) 26 This indicates that about one out of every two public sector reform projects addresses such issues. The likelihood of a country pursuing such reform is 100 percent, given evidence that all 40 of the sample countries had interventions like this.
Different governments pursued similar activities in such reforms as well. Eight kinds of activities were common to all forty countries' reform agendas, and five of these activities 25 Especially the sub-theme titled 'Legal Institutions for a Market Economy' which dominates the major theme. 26 This reflects 2,432 projects with at least one major thematic reference to 'financial and private sector development', 'rule of law' (especially 'legal institutions for a market economy'), and 'trade and integration'. There were 1,884, 555 and 652 references to each of the three major themes, respectively, out of 5,610 references in total.
were related to market-friendly reforms. All 40 countries changed government structures to better provide infrastructure for private sector development, for example. This included interventions like customs reform or adjustments to the way the transportation or water ministries worked. 27 All of the countries also changed some aspect of regulation and competition policy, commonly deregulating and liberalizing sectors. Furthermore, every single country privatized at least one industry in the course of World Bank PAL&J projects and they all used these operations to introduce 'legal institutions for a market economy'.
Three of four countries also took steps to introduce government structures to support better financial reporting standards in private organizations, promote exports, and facilitate trade.
It is particularly striking that these reforms are typically pursued early on in all countries' reform journeys. This is apparent when one breaks reform experiences down into defined periods, of mostly two years in duration, and identifies which period a particular country started its public sector reform journey in and what countries did in this and the ensuing periods. 28 Azerbaijan's PAL&J reforms began in 1994, for example, and 37 projects with 151 themes have been pursued in nine periods since then. 29 Afghanistan had its first public sector reform in 2002. It initiated 56 projects addressing issues in 184 thematic areas in the five ensuing periods. In both examples the first three to four periods of reform (or 6 to 8 years) were dominated by activities establishing the rules of market-friendly government.
At the extreme, 12 of 14 themes addressed in Azerbaijan's first two years of reform involved public sector adjustments intended to facilitate financial and private sector development. The experience is similar across all 40 countries-as summarized in Figure 1 . 27 Algeria's National Water Supply and Sewerage project is an example. Initiated in 1987, this project sought to improve the functionality of the country's water sector to support the construction industry and allow water access for expanding markets. 28 Projects before 1980 and projects between 1980 and 1989 were also considered falling into separate periods. Pre1970s projects were isolated from the rest because of their peculiar status as initial experiments and the 1980s period was separated from the others because about 500 projects were initiated in this time. Periods were identified every two years after this, given that about 500 projects started every two years. focusing government on supporting the private sector. Using the soccer analogy introduced earlier, the new 'rules of the game' decrease the field in which government is played and ensure that the game of government is supportive of private sector players and play.
New rules discipline and modernize governments
Externally influenced reforms also commonly emphasize creating governments that are disciplined and modernized. Such interventions are reflected in the 'Economic Management', 'Public Sector Governance' and 'Urban Development' themes. Activities typically classed as 'Economic Management' include steps to limit political influence over monetary, fiscal and debt policy and force discipline and control in these areas. to their economic and debt management mechanisms in each of the first and second periods of reform. Ninety percent of the countries had introduced some kind of economic management adjustment by the third period of reform. 33 Fewer countries were engaged in such change in later periods-as was the case with market friendly reforms like privatization. These timing similarities suggest that economic management reforms go handin-hand with efforts to establish market-friendly government structures. In fact, both types of activities are often integrated in the same early period operations. 34 Reforms that discipline government are thus related to reforms that liberalize the economy and foster market-friendly government. Both, many would argue, 35 reflect neoliberal ideas that seem to be at the heart-and start-of externally influenced models of public sector reform. Early period reforms in most of the 40 countries look more like first generation interventions. 36 These comprise efforts to bring centralized, ex ante control to public financial management and administration processes. 37 They manifest in aggressive steps to 36 The content of early period reforms with PFM and ACSR themes were analyzed to see if they exhibited first or second generation characteristics. 29 of the 40 countries' early projects were easily identified as being more like first generation reforms. By commonly front-loading first generation interventions, World Bank sponsored public sector reforms again seem to focus first on 'rules of the game' that control and discipline government. This is a hallmark characteristic of externally influenced public sector institutional reforms. No matter which country one is speaking of, rules that bring PFM and civil service discipline are 'right' and the 'right starting point' for reform. Only once control and discipline is established do projects turn to modernizing systems and mechanisms. Interestingly, the steps toward modernization are also common. In PFM, for example, more than 80 percent of the 40 countries have recently adopted multi-year budgets, initiatives to control and rationalize the wage bill through downsizing and reorganization, formalization of pay and employment systems, and aggressive restructuring of administrative entities to minimize redundancy. 38 Second generation reforms PFM comprise steps to adopt multi-year budgeting, IT-based financial management systems, modern internal audit and monitoring and evaluation systems, and even performance management mechanisms. Second generation civil service reforms include attempts to introduce merit-based hiring and compensation mechanisms, performance management and de-concentrated organizational structures. An effective government is small and limited in its engagement, formalized in mission and process and drawing limited revenues primarily from domestic sources. High-quality personnel devise and implement needed programs and deliver efficient and effective services via participatory processes and through formalized, disciplined, efficient and targeted financial management.
Responsiveness to the citizenry's changing needs is high, effected through transparent, decentralized and politically neutral structures; consistently, even during political instability, without impeding (indeed supporting) the private sector. grades countries against common characteristics in twenty criteria areas that represent "policy and institutional dimensions of an effective poverty reduction and growth strategy." 46 The CPIA focuses explicitly on policies and institutional arrangements, considered "the key elements that are within the country's control" given a belief that, "Good policies and institutions are expected to lead, over time, to favorable growth and poverty reduction outcomes." 47 Criteria are generic, specific and reward countries with market-friendly, 48 disciplined, modern and formal institutions. For example, the top score on criteria 15-the quality of public administrationrequires disciplined, modern and formal institutions where:
a.
Effective coordination mechanisms ensure a high degree of policy consistency across departmental boundaries. b.
Organizational structures are along functional lines with very little duplication. Business processes are regularly reviewed to ensure efficiency of decision making and implementation.
c.
Hiring and promotion are based on merit and performance, and ethical standards prevail. d.
The wage bill is sustainable and does not crowd out spending required for public services. e.
Pay and benefit levels do not deter talented people from entering the public sector. f.
There is flexibility (that is not abused) in paying more attractive wages in hard to fill positions (e.g. rural teachers, technical specialists).
Doing Business indicators similarly reward countries with light regulatory burdens and limited government economic engagement. Governments are given titles such as 'Best
Reformer' when they introduce changes to introduce good practice, framed as conformity with a limited and disciplined 'rules of the game' world. Donor-created Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) indicators also define common and specific mechanisms that constitute "good international practices…critical…for all countries to achieve sound public financial management." 49 Countries are rewarded if they introduce 'rules' embedded in formal budget preparation processes, treasury management systems, internal audit mechanisms, standardized accounting systems, and the like. The discussion here should not be read as a critique of endorsement of the one-bestway model that seems to persist in development or even of the idea that international organizations are shaping the government solutions in place across the developing world. It 49 PEFA 2006, 2. simply notes that it exists and is reflected in patterns of World Bank project data. Noting that it exists, however, causes one to ask a simple question: "What does it matter if international agencies are defining governmental solutions in developing countries?" In a sense this question has already been addressed in prior work that criticized one-best-way models without actually providing evidence of such. 50 However, the discussion here should add substance to even these existing studies, giving an evidentiary basis to support those who have raised critiques and fuelling the discussion of whether international organizations are over-reaching their mandates-infringing on the sovereignty of these nations and frustrating domestic processes of finding and fitting government structures to local contexts.
